Global Games and its Applications in Economics: Creditor Coordination Puzzle by Doležal, Tomáš
 
Charles University in Prague 
Faculty of Social Science 
 











Global Games and its Applications in Economics :  














Author: Tomáš Doležal 
Supervisor: Doc. RNDr. Ondřej Kalenda, Ph.D.  
Academic year: 2010/2011 
 
Abstract
This thesis focuses on the creditor coordination problem. The creditor coordi-
nation problem is a problem that arises if there are multiple creditors, which
leads to herd behavior of the creditor and self-fullling prophecies. Theoretical
framework I use for solving this is global games theory, which is a part of non-
cooperative game theory. The question I ask is if there is any explanation for
behavior observed in the German banking system, which contradicts previous
results in global games literature. Namely the fact that the size of eect of the
large creditor becomes detrimental for rolling over the debt, if size of the large
creditor exceeds some optimal value. I found that any of the results do not give
conclusive answer to this problem. On top of that, the result I obtained from
my model suggests that the size eect of the large creditor should be even more
positive. Thus I conclude that this behavior can be attributed to quasi-rents
that the large creditor usurps, as was shown in Hubert and Schaefer [2000], as
any supposable setup does not explain this.
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Abstrakt
Tato práce se zabývá problémem koordinace v¥°itel·. Problém koordinace
v¥°itel· je problém který vyvstává v p°ípad¥, ºe je v¥°itel· více, coº vede ke stá-
dovému chování a sebenapl¬ujícím proroctvím. Teoretický aparát, který k °e²ení
tohoto pouºívám je teorie globálních her, jenº je £ástí nekooperativní teorie
her. Otázka, kterou se snaºím zoodpov¥d¥t je zdali lze v ní nalézt vysv¥tlení
pro chování pozorované v n¥meckém bankovním sektoru, jenº je protich·dné k
dosavadním výsledk·m v literatu°e aplikující p°ístup globálních her. Konkrétn¥
fakt, ºe od ur£ité optimální míry velikosti velkého v¥°itele je jeho efekt na
úsp¥²né nancování projektu záporný. Zjistil jsem, ºe ºádný z výsledk· nedává
p°esv¥d£ivou odpov¥¤ na tento problém. Navíc °e²ení mého modelu nazna£uje,
ºe efekt velikosti velkého v¥°itele by m¥l být je²t¥ pozitivn¥j²í. Tudíº usuzuji,
ºe toto empiricky pozorované chování m·ºe být p°isouzeno kvazi-rentám, které
si velcí v¥°itelé p°isvojují, jak bylo prokázáno v £lánku od Hubert and Schaefer
[2000], jelikoº ºádný ze mnou uvaºovaných model· toto chování není schopen
vysv¥tlit.
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The problem we pretend to solve is the problem of creditor coordination. This
problem can be interpreted in a following way - debtor who is solvent so he
could repay the loan with interest is cut o from nancing from his creditors
so he is illiquid and he defaults. This is dierent to the case when the debtor
could not repay the loan even if all the creditors remained lending. In the
creditor coordination problem the problem are not the economic fundamentals,
but herd behavior of the creditors. In the original paper on debt pricing by
Merton [1974], namely in its empirical part, we can nd such an anomaly for
highly risky debts where the eect of creditor coordination problem is reected
the most. Therefore the problem of solvent but illiquid debtors who fail only
because of coordination failure of creditors is an example of irrational decision
made by rational decision makers.
To answer this puzzle at least theoretically we adopt novel approach of global
games. This branch of game theory was devised by Carlsson and VanDamme
[1993] and further developed by Morris and Shin [2003] into an applicable tool
how to tackle real world problems. Basic idea of global games is that players do
not cooperate in their actions, they cannot observe true state of the world and
they do not know what the others are doing. This is fairly relaxed assumption
on behavior of the people in real world situations.
My objective is to answer question that arises from discrepancy between
empirical ndings and theoretical models, namely to build a model that could
solve following mismatch. The problem is that in Krahnen and Brunner [2000]
we observe contradictory behavior of creditors - basic insight from the theory
of global games, as I will show below, is that with increasing size of the large
creditor, creditor coordination should increase. In this paper, the results are
not supportive for this theoretical view.
But what is important to note is the fact that solutions of creditor coordi-
nation problems are only one side of the coin - even though results from global
games theory generally favor large creditor over small creditors, opportunistic




Theory and Solution concepts
In this part, I present basic concepts from game theory, which I further use in
explaining of global games. I start with denitions from game theory and then I
continue with explanation of chronological development of global games theory
used in this thesis.
2.1 Elements of Game Theory
Here I present brief overview of non-cooperative game theory. The sources I
used are Fudenberg and Tirole [1991], Gibbons [1992] and Yildiz. Notations I
used for unifying is that from Yildiz.
First, I begin with denition of the game we are playing - it is a Bayesian Game,
as the players are uncertain about outcomes of the game. But global game has
also some other properties, as I will present later.
Bayesian Game
A Bayesian game is a list (N,A,Θ, T, u, p) where:
 N is the set of players
 A = (Ai)i∈N is the set of action proles ( with generic member a =
(ai)i∈N )
 Θ is a set of payo parameters θ
 T = (Ti)i∈N is the set of action proles ( with generic member t = (t)i∈N )
 ui : Θ×A→ R is the payo function of player i, and
 pi(.|ti) ∈ 4(Θ× T−i) is the belief of type ti about (θ, t−i)
Next, consider what are the possibilities of the players. In the language of
game theory, this is called strategy, which is dened by
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Strategy
A strategy of a player i is a function si : Ti → Ai
And strategies of particular interest in the theory of global games are namely
Strictly Dominant Strategies, which are strategies that we dene as
Strictly Dominant Strategy
First denote list of all strategies played by players other than player i by S−i.
Then we have following denition of Strictly Dominant Strategy : A strategy
s∗i strictly dominantes strategy si if and only if ui(s
∗
i , s−i) > ui(si, s−i),for all
s−i ∈ S−i.
Strictly dominant strategies are used in proving that the global game has unique
strategy that survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated (dominated, not
dominant) strategies, which means that the game is dominance solvable.
The objective of global games is nding of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, which
is dened as
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
A strategy prole s∗ = (s∗1, ..s
∗
n) is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in an n-person
static game of incomplete information if and only if for each player i and type
ti ∈ Ti,












n(tn), (ti, t−i)] ×
pi(t−i|ti),
where ui is the utility of the player i, and ai denotes his action.
Therefore, for each player i, each type ti this player chooses action optimal
under conditional beliefs pi(t−i|ti) , that is conditionally on the other player
type and action.
But denition of Nash Equilibrium should not be omitted at least for complet-
ness.
Nash Equilibrium
A strategy vector s ∈ S is said to be a Nash equilibrium if for all players i and
alternate strategy s′i ∈ S, we have that
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i)
Please note that −i reers to the other player (dierent from player i)
Finally, concept used for proving of uniqueness of the strategy is Iterated Elim-
ination of Strictly Dominated Actions, where the idea is kept in its name.
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Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions
Consider a Bayesian game B = (N,A,Θ, T, u, p). For each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti,
set S0i [ti] = Ai, and dene sets S
k
i [ti] for k > 0 iteratively, by letting ai ∈ Ski [ti]








i, a−i)dπ(θ, t−i, a−i)
for some π ∈ 4(Θ× T−i ×A−i) such that
margΘ×T−iπ = pi(.|ti)
and
π = (a−i ∈ Sk−1−i [t−i]) = 1.
This is what is essential from the game theory and now I pass on to the theory
of global games. First I present chronological overview of this theory, as I con-
sider this as the easiest way how to present key ideas and next I continue with
solution concepts, where I propose a manual how to solve the global games for
private information only.
2.2 Overview of theory of global games
Theory of global games is built around two major papers, the rst is the article
by Carlsson and VanDamme [1993], which initiated the theory of global games,
based on 2 × 2 games, the second is the article by Morris and Shin [2003] who
generalized this theory to n players case and continuous players case. What
is essential about approach adopted by Carlsson and VanDamme is the fact
that they removed assumption of common knowledge about economic funda-
mentals and and introduced players´ uncertainty about other players behavior
in equilibrium. For approach preceding global games see Obstfeld [1986], which
is perfect example of this approach. Here the author assumes that economic
fundamentals are commong knowledge, i.e. information perfectly observed by
everyone, and that everyone knows how would everyone behave. This results
in multiple equilibria, which is what can be avoided by adopting approach of
global games. For evidence, see part dealing with symmetric information model,
where it is shown that it indeed results in multiple equilibria.
In explaining theory of global games, it is benecial to stick to this chrono-
logical order. First, we explain two-player global game :
Carlsson and Van Damme paid attention to the problem of Nash equilibrium,
namely the problem of non-uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, in noncooperative
games.
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and each player has choice between two strategies - α is a safe strategy,
that yields always x, no matter what the other player does. β is a strategy
that yields 1 only if the other player also chooses β , but if the other player
chooses α, then this strategy yields 0. Therefore this game has two strict Nash
equilibria - ᾱif both players choose α, and β̄ if both players choose β. This bring
the element of strategic uncerntainty - the dilemma is should the players choose
higher payo in equilibrium β̄, bearing risk that they can receive 0 as well, or
should they favor safe action in equilibrium ᾱ? The result is obtained by adding
small amount of noise to the game, namely considering that there is incomplete
information about x.
Then we move to the article by Morris and Shin [2003], and modify their
denitions to suit the models I will solve later.
The symmetric binary action global game we will use in solving the rst
proposed model has following properties :
There is a continuum of players of measure 1 - what I should point out here
is the fact that every single player is considered negligble in comparison to the
others. This was corrected by Heinemann [2000], who also presents corrected
statement regarding the original paper.
Each of the players has to choose an action a ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 stands for
rollover and 0 for foreclosure. These two actions would be interpreted in later.
All players have the same payo function u : {0, 1} × [0, 1]× R→ R, where
u(a, l, x)is a player's payo if he chooses action a, proportion l of his opponents
choose action 0, and his "private signal" is x.
We assume that his payo is independent of which of his opponents choose
action 1.
Best response is dened only as payo gain from choosing one action and
not the other - for best response itself, we do not care for behavior of the others.
The utility function is parametrized by a function π : [0, 1] × R→ R which
has following form
π(l, x) ≡ u(1, l, x)− u(0, l, x)
Finally, we say that the action is Laplacian if it is best response to a uniform
prior over the oponents' choice of action. Thus the action 1 is the Laplacian
action at x if
1́
l=0











u(0, l, x)dl < 0
Generically, a continuum player, symmetric payo, two action game will
have exactly one Laplacian action.
A state θ is drawn according to the improper uniform density on the real
line - therefore we have only posterior distribution as a consequence of. Simply
speaking, improper prior is the case when the prior density goes to zero.
Player i observes a private signal xi = θ+σεi, where σ > 0 is a real constant,
which denes precision of information.
The noise terms εi are distributed in the population with continuous sym-
metric single-peaked probability density function f , with support on the real
line.
The uniform prior on the real line is improper , i.e. has innite probability





σ ) on state θ, for details, see Hartigan [1983].
We impose ve properties on the payos :
Action monotonicity:π(l, θ) is non-increasing in l.
State monotonicity:π(l, θ) is non-decreasing in θ.





Limit dominance : There exist θ ∈ R and θ̄ ∈ R such that π(l, x) ≤ 0 for all




g(l)π(l, x)dl is continuous with respect to signal x and den-
sity g.
For the model with large creditors, either static or sequential, it was proved
by Corsetti et al. [2004] that the results concerning dominance solvability of






In this chapter, I apply theory of global games to the problem of creditor co-
ordination. First, to a static model of creditor coordination, where we allow
for uniform improper prior about fundamentals. This results in a model with
explicit solutions and therefore more educative eect, but it removes aspect of
public information from the model. This can be seen as trivial from the point
of view of global games literature, because it follows exactly the same logic as
Corsetti et al. [2004] and Schuele and Stadler [2005] . I found that this model
was already solved by Takeda [2003], but I decided to keep it because the au-
thor omitted several minor issues(namely comparative statics away from the
limit and considerations about nature of the information) and also for explana-
tory reasons. I extend model setup from this paper, because I consider that
some more realistic assumptions could explain puzzle that I proposed in the
introduction - why do the creditor pools work best only for mid-size, why are
they superior to either fragmented creditor structure or to larger creditor pools.
My reection is that richer action prole and more realistic nature of informa-
tion could explain this. Therefore I build a new sequential move model, which
reects strategy structure adopted by novel work by Bjoenes et al. [2011], where
the authors user this reasoning for a model that captures empirically observed
behavior in currency attacks. In my conception this model with some modi-
cations regarding logic of actions can also capture bargaining aspect of creditor
coordination, where the large creditor can prosper from his size and capabilities.
The third model is the basic sequential move model as was devised by Corsetti
et al. [2004], which was already solved by Schuele and Stadler [2005] and I only
use for comparison of the results. Next we move to illustrative results from one
empirical study that directed me to my research topic.
In Krahnen and Brunner [2000] we can nd evidence that creditor's structure
is fundamental for solvent debtors to stay liquid. The authors present evidence
from German banks where they observe that crucial aspect for succesfull credi-
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tor coordination, attaining best possible outcome for either creditors or debtors,
is formation of so-called creditor pool. A creditor pool is an alliance that some
of the small creditors form, and therefore they create the large creditor. But the
question is why the empirical evidence contradicts theoretical insights that with
larger creditor pool the results are worse than for the smaller ones. This contra-
dicts basic observations from global games literature, which shows that there is
a linear relation between size of the large player in general and consecutive eect
on the result of the game. This is because of the fact that with increasing size of
the large player the strategic uncertainty in the game vanishes, as can be seen
in the original paper on the asymmetric binary action global game by Corsetti
et al. [2004], where the eect of size the large currency speculator results in
higher probability of currency attack. But in this paper the eect of signalling
(to let the others know what you are doing) and relative information structure
(what would the large player do, if he believes that he is better informed than
the small players?) is considered as well and the sequential move model is built
on this considerations. This is what is what I consider in this thesis and I com-
pare the results that completely reect this reasoning with results that I obtain
if I adopt more realistic assumptions on both the information structure and the
allowed actions. Now I explain what is the basic idea of creditor coordination
problem in broader sense.
3.1 Motivation for Global Games Approach
As I mentioned in the introduction, there are issues in debt pricing, namely
why standard debt pricing models fails in pricing high-risk corporate bonds.
To illuminate this, I propose following highly stylized balance sheet, which is
helpful for further explanations.
assets liabilities
cash short-term debt
risk assets long-term debt
equity
Standard approach based on this highly stylized balance sheet is that the
credit risk of the company is measured as
risk assets
equity
i.e. the more risky assets in comparison to equity the rm has, the higher is
the credit risk. If this ratio is high, we say that the rm is insolvent with high
probability - it can easily happen that you will not get paid if you keep your
investments in this rm. This is what we basically call fundamental risk in this
work.
But there are also some other risks, namely risks that creditors would see
their short term too high in comparison to cash ( and its equivalents) of the
11
rm, therefore believing that there is substantial probability that some creditors
will not get paid if they would not collect their collateral early
short-term debt
cash
i.e. there is some probability that you would be better o if you would cash
out your collateral early, instead of rolling over the debt. This is what we call
strategic risk in this work.
Please note that the major impact of global games literature is that it has
focused at the addition of strategic risk components instead of focusing on fun-
damental risk only. This is the basic concept of creditor coordination problem,
which is reected in defaultable debt pricing, and this is what I further put to
use for explanation of behavior of the creditors under various assumptions on
their structure, information and possible actions.
3.2 Basic setup of the model
First, we set up a basic model of creditor coordination. We have one large
creditor and a continuum of small creditors who face uncertainty about yield
of debt. They can either chose to withdraw their investment, thus cashing out
collateral k , or wait until maturity of the debt and obtain liquidation value
v, which depends on success of the investment. Therefore we have three states
of debt - best outcome is that loan succeeds and creditors are paid liquidation
value L - this is uncertain, worse outcome is that the creditors foreclose on a
loan a receive their collateral K∗ - this is certain, and the worst outcome is that
creditors roll over the loan until maturity but the loan fail and they are paid




What is essential is the fact that there are two aspects that have eect on
either success or failure of the project - not only economic fundamentals θ,
but also proportion of creditors l, which denotes proportion of creditors who
foreclose on a loan. This results in a payo function v
v(θ, l) =
V ⇔ l ≤ θ
K∗ ⇔ l > θ
Where V is a constant greater than L. If we normalize L = 1 and K∗ = 0
(interpretation is not important, but you can imagine this is a percentage of
best possible payo), we get matrix of possible payo, where k = K
∗−K∗
L−K∗ .
project succeeds project fails
Roll over loan 1 0
Foreclose on loan k k
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This matrix of payos summarizes posibble outcomes of the game in this
model.
We also assume that either large or small creditors are risk neutral. Risk
neutrality means that decision maker's Bernoulli utility function of money is
linear.
Basic insight of the model is as follows : if we remember that we wrote 1 for
rollover and 0 for foreclosure, we have what
u(1, l, θ) =
1⇔ l ≤ θ
0⇔ l > θ
which denotes utility from the action "rollover" and
u(0, l, θ) = k
which denotes utility from the action "foreclosure" and which holds for all
states of the world θ. This is what is often described in the global games
literature as the "status quo", the safe action.
Next consider what is the utility under various states of the world - this is
simply utility in the form
π(l, θ) = u(1, l, θ)− u(0, l, θ) = 1− k ⇔ l ≤ θ
−k ⇔ l > θ





−k ⇔ θ ≤ 0
θ − k ⇔ 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
1− k ⇔ θ ≥ 1
which means that θ∗ = k is the equilibrium condition, which we will derive
in the models later, this holds for the case small creditors.
As the last remember I should point out that the primary insight of the
model is that value of collaterilazed debt is
V (k) = kF (k) + 1− F (k) = 1− (1− k)F (k)
,where F and f are distribution a probability function of normal distribution,
and his value increases with value of collateral k
dV (k)
dk
= F (k)− (1− k)f(k)
Those are basic insights from the introductory paper by Morris and Shin [2003]
and now, we turn our attention to various interpretations this basic setup allows.
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3.2.1 The model with asymmetric information
The rst model I solve is the static model of creditor coordination, where the in-
formation is asymmetric. This means that information perceived by each player
is dierent, but the distribution function of the underlying random variable is
the same for all. This allows the player to assess the actions of the others - he
does not know what the others know, but this is sucient. Please consider that
this model was also partially solved by Takeda [2003], so my own input is that
when I solved it previously on my own I considered some extra questions, that
I will mention during the progress of solution.
Information
Information perceived by large and small creditors varies, which we will consider
later, is a realization of random variable. To formalize the information structure
we have that small creditors observe realization of random variable xi about
fundamentals θwith precision σabout random variable εi ,formally
xi = θ + σεi (3.1)
where εi is a random variable distributed accordingly to smooth symmet-
ric density function f with mean 0 and σ, precision of information, is a real
constants greater than zero. Cumulative distribution fuction of this probability
density function f is denoted F .
Large creditor observes realization of random variable y about fundamentals
θwith precision τ about random variable η ,formally
y = θ + τη (3.2)
where η is a random variable distributed accordingly smooth symmetric den-
sity function g with mean 0 and τ , precision of information, is a real constants
greater than zero. Cumulative distribution fuction of this probability density
function g is denoted G.
Assume also that εi is independent and identically distributed random vari-
able and each εi is independent of η.
3.2.1.1 Small creditors only
We have a continuum of small creditors of measure 1. Small creditor i receives
signal xi and foreclose on a loan if his signal is lower than threshold value x
∗.
What is important is that small creditors do not observe any public information,
which means that there is no source of multiple equlibrium in the settings. This
is what was proved by Morris and Shin [1998].
First, we consider decision of small creditor based on their private signal
xi = θ + σεi, which denes proportion of foreclosing creditors l.
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P (xi ≤ x∗|θ) = F (
x∗ − θ
σ
) = l (3.3)
From payo function we know that critical level of foreclosure with given
θ depends on participation of creditors l , therefore rollover of the debt is not
allowed if
l > θ (3.4)
.
This gives us condition for critical volume of creditors who received signall less
than threshold value x∗, which is
θ∗ = l (3.5)
and denes switching point between rolling over the debt and foreclosing.




) = θ∗ (3.6)
which results in switching strategy x∗.
x∗ = θ∗ + σF−1(θ∗) (3.7)
This denes critical signal below which every single small creditor foreclose
on a loan because he thinks that everyone else would do so.
Next we consider the question of behavior of creditor who received signal xi =
θ + σεi about fundamentals θ
∗.This denes conditional probability of project's
success and the small creditor observing signal xi = θ + σεi assigns following
probability about fundamentals strong enough for rolling over the debt
P (θ ≥ θ∗|xi) = 1− F (
θ∗ − xi
σ





Then the small creditor considers if the expected gain from rolling over the debt




) ≥ k (3.9)
This is because he is risk neutral and chooses higher payo irrespectively of
risk.
Therefore his second equilibrium condition for rollover is given as expected




) = k (3.10)
which we solve for explicit switching strategy x∗
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x∗ = θ∗ + σF−1(k) (3.11)
Results above give use following proposition :
Proposition 1. If λ = 0,the equilibrium is dened by these two equations
x∗ = k + σF−1(k) (3.12)
θ∗ = k (3.13)




as k - value of collateral, is some real constant and F−1(k) is a real constant
as well.
To summarize behavior of small creditors, we can say that they will foreclose
on the debt if realization of fundamentals θ is lower than k, and individual
creditors will foreclose on the debt if their private signal xi about this realization
of fundamentals θ was lower than k + σF−1(k). But note that with increasing
precision of information individual creditors will foreclose on the debt if their
signal is lower than k, which equals foreclosure of creditors as a group.
3.2.1.2 Large creditor only
For large creditor only, the problem of coordination simplies into a simple de-
cision about expected payo as there is no coordination problem. Hence the
large player who observes signal y decides about foreclosure only by consider-
ing his threshold value y∗, which results from his private information y = θ+τν .
As he is the only one creditor, he is better o if expected gain from lending
is higher than the value of collateral





) > k (3.15)




) = k (3.16)
And threshold value of y
y∗ = τG−1(k) (3.17)
This gives us following statement about behavior of large creditor :
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Proposition 2. If λ = 1, the equilibrium is dened by equation
y∗ = τG−1(k)
And if we consider limiting cases, then
lim
τ→0
y∗ = 0 (3.18)
as k - value of collateral, is some real constant and G−1(k) is a real constant
as well.
Resumé is that large creditor forecloses on the debt if his private signal y
about fundamentals θ is lower than τG−1(k) . Note that as precision of his
information goes to zero, i.e. his information is very precise, he decides to
foreclose only if his observed private signal is lower than 0.
Conclusion on benchmark cases
In this simplied analysis, we showed the idea of coordination - for the small
creditors, where the result is determined by behavior of many, it is fundamental,
but for the large creditor there is none.
Motivation for small and large creditors problem
But next we show what was meant by this line from Prime Minister of Malaysia,
Mohammad bin Mahathir in response to speculative attack by George Soros
during South Asia's currency and nancial crisis in 19996. For full article see
Friedman [1997].
"We thought they were helping us to prosper. We conducted
road shows to encourage them to invest in our share and nancial
markets. We will continue to do so," he said, adding: "We still
believe there are sincere investors out there. But there are also
quite a few rogues who can cause an avalanche forcing others to run
for cover."
If we translate what Mr Mahathir said into language of global, we have following
model of large and small players - in this case not speculators, but creditors.
And in the end we will show it does not matter. Even though it was targeted
mostly to currency attacks, we can nd analogy in the end. I chose to present
this particular statement instead of statement directly related to creditor coor-
dination as it is related in principle and well known from public debate.
3.2.1.3 Large and small creditors
If we consider case where there both large and small creditors, situation change.
The large creditor pays attention to behavior of small creditors as he is no longer
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determining equilibrium alone. The small creditors also pay attention to exis-
tence of large creditor as there is major change if the large player is participating
or not.
First, we consider small players and signal they perceive. Consider that small
players represent 1−λof continuum of creditors with measure 1. Remaining λis
volume of large creditor. Therefore for volume of small players observing signal
higher than x∗we have that
(1− λ)P (xi ≥ x∗|θ) = (1− λ)(1− F (
x∗ − θ
σ




for the loan to be rolled over with only small creditors participating, it must
be that
(1− (1− λ)F (θ − x
∗
σ
)) < θ (3.20)
and consequently critical value of fundamentals for only small creditors par-
ticipating is




. This determines value of fundamentals where lending only by small credi-
tors is sucient for rolling over the debt.
Next we move to the case where also the large creditor takes part in rolling over
the debt. For large and small creditors participating simultaneously it must be
that
(1− λ+ (1− λ)F (θ − x
∗
σ
)) < θ (3.22)
which gives us second critical value of fundamentals for both large and small
creditors participating is




. This determines value of fundamentals that is sucient for rolling over the
debt if the large creditor participates too.
As both critical values of fundamentals are functions of switching strategy
x∗of small creditors, which consequently depends on switching strategy y∗ of
large creditor, we must solve for this switching point simultaneously by con-
sidering equilibrium condition of large creditors given his expected gain from
foreclosure.






) > k (3.24)
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) = k (3.25)
and explicitly
y∗ = θ + τG−1(k) (3.26)
. This denes value of fundamentals given precision of information, τ → 0 above
which the large creditors wishes to roll over the debt.








. Implications of this behavior will follow in the comparative statics in the limit
section.
Next we move to the question what would be the small creditor's action for
values of fundamentals above θ . If we consider probability that small creditor





and if we derivate this we get the probability density of small creditor









where it holds that for fundamentals θ ≥ θ̄ , the small creditors alone are
sucient for successful rolling over, and for θ̄ > θ ≥ θ it depends on the large
creditor - success comes only if large creditor takes part in lending too, and for
fundamentalsθ < θ the debt would be always foreclosed.
This jointly gives us this equation for expected payo from lending









































)dθ ≥ k (3.32)



















)dθ = k (3.33)
. This equation determines expected payo from rolling over the debt, where
the rst part of the left hand side of the equation is expected payo from be-
havior of small and large creditors jointly and the second part of this equation
denotes expected payo from small creditors only. As the large creditor's switch-
ing strategy is already dened, we proceed to switching strategy of the small
































and the same condition for equilibrium applies too, total expected payo













f(z)dz = k (3.36)
But the problem is that this equation has not got any closed form solution.
This will be solved as a comparative statics in the limit and away from the limit
as was proposed in Corsetti et al. [2004].
To summarize the results, we have that


























what is interesting now is the question what would be the eect of change









(1− λ)f( θ−x∗σ ) + σ
=
1










(1− λ)f( θ−x∗σ ) + σ
=
1
(1− λ)f(δ) + σ
< 0









































in x∗, we know from , namely from mean-value theorem and from the fact that
this function is strictly monotonic, that there is a unique solution for x∗, and
once x∗ is solved, we can consequently determine y∗, as y∗ is a response to x∗.
But the problem remains that in general we do not know any of them explicitly.
Once we have proved that there exist unique solution ( for proof of iterated
dominance argument for asymmetric binary global games see Corsetti et al.
[2004], this is extension of proof from Morris and Shin [2003]), we move to what
is the objective of these computation - explicit solution for θ̄ and θ.
We have two options - rst, we impose some limiting properties on precision of
information, and the second is the possibility to compare possible states of θ̄
and θ away from the limit.
3.2.1.3.1 Comparative statics in the limit This was already solved by
Takeda, so I restrict from repeating his solutions. Following original work by
Takeda [2003], we have that for
σ → 0, τ → 0, στ → r






This boundary condition is the only one that is interesting, because it denes
range of fundamentals below which the foreclosure will occur.
3.2.1.3.2 Comparative statics away from the limit This is what the
author omitted, so I present this solution. Results away from the limit are more
complex than those in the limit. There are additional beliefs about probabilities
of successful and unsuccessful rollovers, so that we are always unsure what could
happen in the interval θ̄ > θ ≥ θ , but we know for sure that debt would be
always rolled over for fundamentals θ > θ̄ and always foreclosed for fundamentals
θ < θ. What is important for results in the interval θ̄ ≥ θ ≥ θ is the fact that
the lending is successful only if the large players is participating. Our results
are summarized in the following table.
probability of rollover state of fundamentals







if θ̄ ≥ θ ≥ θ
0 if θ < θ





and if we consider that switching strategy for the large creditor is
y∗ = θ + τG−1(k) (3.41)







3.2.2 The Model with Symmetric Information
Here I present the model of creditor coordination where symmetric information.
This brings us back to the beginning, where I explained motivation for global
games approach - here I show consequences of symmetric information assump-
tion in the model of creditor coordination. This is what would be the result of
adopting approach similar to Obstfeld [1986], which he used for explanation of
currency crises.
In the setup of the model, the only change from asymmetric information
model is that we have information symmetric for all creditors i
ai = a = θ + ρχ (3.42)
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, so that small creditors observe realization of random variable ai about
fundamentals θwith precision ρabout random variable χ. χ is a random variable
distributed accordingly to smooth symmetric density function h with mean 0
and ρ, precision of information, is a real constants greater than zero. Cumulative
distribution fuction of this probability density function h is denoted H.
Remember that for θ > 1, even if no one is lending, the project succeeds,
for θ < 0 the project fails irresptively what the creditors do and for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
the project succeeds if less than l of mass of creditors foreclose. If we consider
our previous results where we have two Bayesian-Nash equilibria, we have that
everyone either foreclose or rollover the debt, based on value of fundamentals.
Therefore if we consider expected gain from lending for individual creditor,
conditional on l = 0, everyone is lending, we have that
P (θ ≥ 1|a)− k.P (θ < 1|a) = H(a− 1
ρ
)− k (3.43)
which is implicit condition for critical signal condition, which we solve for
a∗0 = 1 + ρH
−1(k) (3.44)
.
This results in condition for critical signal the individual small creditor has to
receive so that he foreclose on the debt. If he receives higher signal, he continues
lending, and if he receives lower signal, he forecloses.
But we also have to account for the second possibility, that individual cred-
itor believes that l = 1,i.e. everyone foreclosed on the debt. For this condition
we have that expected gain from lending
P (θ ≥ 0|a)− k.P (θ < 0|a) = H(a− 0
ρ
)− k = H(a
ρ
)− k (3.45)





Therefore we have two equilibrium conditions which have the same rationaliza-
tion - each of them is optimal strategy for individual small creditor conditional
on his beliefs about behavior of the others. This is the major result of global
games, where (albeit under some restrictions, for details on uniqueness condi-
tions see Morris and Shin [1998]) there is unique equilibrium due to assymetricity
of information.
If we consider what could happen, we have two ranges of signal where we
know the action undertaken - for signal higher than a∗0, all creditors rollover, as
this is also higher than a∗1. For signal lower than a
∗
0(which is also lower than
a∗1) all creditors foreclose. This is true for sure, but now consider that critical
signal is not higher than a∗0 and not lower than a
∗
1 - there is no decision rule,
so in this case, the decision is purely random. This is stronger claim than in
23
the case of self-fullling prophecy, where the outcome is determined by beliefs
of players, this is only random as the creditors do not have any decision rule.
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3.3 Extended creditor coordination model with
sequential moves
Then, we solve creditor coordination game with delay allowed. This brings
interesting strategy structure, as the players do not consider only actions of the
others, but also timing of the other players. Here we adopt approach based on
work from Bjoenes et al. [2011], where they adopted novel approach for solving
currency attack model with sequential moves. They argue that in previous
sequential moves models, such as can be found in Schuele and Stadler [2005] and
Corsetti et al. [2004], there is a perfect information about behavior of the large
player, and furthermore, those models allow only for strict structure of delay in
actions - large player either moves rst, or does not move at all. Bjoenes et al.
[2011] also stress the fact that in empirical studies, large currency traders often
move as the rst, inducing attack, and then they move again after the small
currency traders attack the currency, so they do not bear any risk and cash in
on results of their early speculation.
I adopt basic idea of this model in a model of creditor coordination, where
the interpretation of my model is as follows - the large creditor continues lending
to the debtor, but he does not lend all he could lend, he waits for small creditors
to participate on rolling over the debt and if there is some extra need for credit,
he provides debtor with any requested amount of credit as the large creditor has
easy access to credit and knows that he will gain prot in lending. Inspiration
for doing this was found in the article by Krahnen and Brunner [2000], where
they emphasize impact of banks and creditor pools. A creditor pool is a coalition
of small creditors who behave as a large creditor, should we interpret this in
language of global games. They underline that negotiations about sharing risk
from debtor´s bankruptcy are much easier if there is a large creditor (a bank or
a creditor pool), and those negotiations are often lengthy, resulting in gradual
lending, where creditors behave very cautiously until the success is almost sure.
To formalize this, I create this model :
First, consider that order of actions is as follows -
 period 1 - θis chosen by nature
 period 2 - creditors receive information
 period 3 - large creditor decides to roll over or foreclose with a view to
induce further lending by small creditors
 period 4 - small creditors decide to roll over or foreclose based on informa-
tion that was amended by large creditor´s early move, their joint action
until period 4 determinates either success or failure of the lending
 period 5 - if the early lending by large and small creditors is successful,
large creditor decides to lend more, if he has the possibility
Then, I denote volume of lending by each respective creditor at each period in
a following way :
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 Volume of early lending by large creditor α is the volume of credit that
large creditor wishes to lend with a view of inuencing small creditors´
behavior
 Volume of lending by small creditors γ , which denotes volume of lending
by the small creditors after they observes information about state of the
debt, which was previously inuenced by large creditor´s lending.
 Volume of late lending by large creditor β is the volume of lending that
large creditor wishes to lend after he is armed in his views on debtors
solvency and protability. Note that it is also possible that large creditor
may, or may not have chance to lend in period 5, after small creditors´
action, which we denote by probability q that there is no such oportunity.
I also assume, that large creditors lending is not limited, i.e. he has access
to credit which is not limited, if he considers that lending is not protable.
The only limitation is the fact that α will be never more (or equal to) 1, as it
contradicts basic setup of the model.
As we mentioned in introduction to this model, information perceived by
small creditors is not based on fully credible large player as in Schuele and
Stadler [2005], but it depends on real eects of large creditor on economic fun-
damentals, increasing small creditor's signal by large creditor's volume of early
loan α
xi = θ + α+ σεi (3.47)
.
But information perceived by large creditor remains the same,
y = θ + τη
as the large creditor´s views are not changed, he has only richer set of
strategies.
Next we impose following condition on success of the project, where α + γ
denotes total volume of lending available to debtor. The project fails if
(α+ γ) ≥ θ
which gives us condition for foreclosure
(α+ γ)∗=θ (3.48)
As in the static model, we rst solve for small creditors' switching strategy
x∗. In doing so, we rst derive condition for small creditors who continue lending
γ . To continue lending, small player must observe signal xi about fundamentals
θ + α higher than x∗, formally
P (xi ≥ x∗|θ + α) = P (θ + α+ σεi ≥ x∗) =
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P (εi ≥
x∗ − (θ + α)
σ
) = 1− F (x
∗ − (θ + α)
σ
) = F (




This denes volume of creditors who continue lending. We denote this γ,
volume of lending by small creditors.
F (
(θ + α)− x∗
σ
) = γ (3.50)
.
And considering small players' perceived information about fundamentals,
we have that




which denes condition under which lending by small creditors after early
lending by the large creditor succeeds.
This implies that the rst equilibrium condition - critical mass of small
creditors - is
(θ + α)∗ = F (




Next, we move to small creditors´ expectations about strength of fundamen-
tals which ensures that the expected gain from lending is higher than expected
gain from foreclosure. Note that in the previous section we showed that in the
simple static game critical signal which denes foreclosure is generally higher
than critical fundamentals which denes foreclosure as well.
For small creditors' perceived expected gain from foreclosing on the debt we
have that
P (θ + α ≤ (θ + α)∗ |xi) = P (xi − σεi ≤ (θ + α)∗) =
= P (εi ≥
xi − (θ + α)∗
σ
) = 1− F (xi − (θ + α)
∗
σ
) = F (
(θ + α)∗ − xi
σ
) (3.53)
and for small creditors to favor foreclosure on the debt instead of rolling over
the debt it must be that
F (
(θ + α)∗ − xi
σ
) ≤ k (3.54)
which denes our second equilibrium condition, which is implicitly given by
small creditors' indierence condition
F (
(θ + α)∗ − x∗
σ
) = k (3.55)
.
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This condition says that for value of fudamentals less than (θ + α)∗ the
expected gain from foreclosure is higher than expected gain from rolling over
the debt.
If we solve this implicitly given condition, we get this switching strategy
x∗ = (θ + α)∗ − σF−1(k) (3.56)
which denes critical signal, but there this still implicitly depends on (θ+α)∗,
so we solve for this and if we substitute this condition for switching strategy
into equation
(θ + α)∗ = F (




(θ+α)∗ = F (
(θ + α)∗ + σF−1(k)− (θ + α)∗
σ
) = F (−F−1(k)) = F (F−1(k)) = k
(3.58)
and we obtain following switching strategy
x∗ = k − σF−1(k) (3.59)
and critical value of fundamentals
θ∗ = k − α (3.60)
and therefore debt is foreclosed only if perceived value of fundamentals falls
below critical value of fundamentals
θ < θ∗ = k − α (3.61)
.This is all we need for small creditors strategy prole and we turn our attention
to the large creditor.
The large player cares only about his expected gain, not about how many
peers join the attack - he has no strategic uncertainty. But there is strategic
uncertainty in the group of small creditors.
Thus we evaluate what is the large creditor's volume of lending in early phase
of "credit talks"
P (θ ≥ θ∗|y) = P (y − τη ≥ k − α|y) = P (η ≤ y − k + α
τ
|y) = G(




And afterward we consider his decision regarding lending in late phase of
"credit talks" - but there is some probability that there is no need for late
lending - either is debtor comfortable with volume of credit, or large creditor
comes too late. This condition is imposed to show that late lending is not that
safe and large player has to consider risks.
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E(π) = G(
y − k − α
τ
) (L(1− q) + qα)− kα (3.63)







y − k + α
τ
)q − k != 0 (3.64)
g(







Note that if we impose condition of impossibility of late lending, setting q =
1, we have a model parallel to that of Schuele and Stadler [2005], except for
information structure, but strategy proles remain the same.
E(π) = G(
y − k + α
τ
)α− kα (3.66)
3.4 Creditor coordination model with sequential
moves
Here I present work by Schuele and Stadler [2005], which completes this trio of
models. The authors assume following work by Corsetti et al. [2004] that the
large player benets from signalling his decision to small player, who benet
from waiting because the only information that could aect their behavior is
the move by the large player. Therefore timing of their action is as follows
 period 1 - θis chosen by Nature
 period 2 - large creditor decides to roll over or foreclose with a view to
induce further lending by small creditors
 period 3 - small creditors decide to roll over or foreclose based on infor-
mation that was amended by large creditor´s move.
Results from this model setup are provided in the following section, but
the were also able to gure out other results, including threshold, which I
omit as it is not for the problem I attempt to answer.
Unconvincing nature of this model inspired me to adopt approach from
Bjoenes et al. [2011], where the authors suggest much more realistic set of
assumptions. This includes richer time structure, concretely large player
can move either before the small players move or even after they move,
and the large player has also mostly unlimited access to credit.
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3.5 Comparison of various models of creditor co-
ordination
Finally I present all the three solutions to the models of creditor coordination,
a static one, with sequential moves and with extended model with sequential
moves.
In the static model, it holds that
θ = (1− (1− λ)F (δ̄)) (3.67)
θ = (1− λ− (1− λ))F (δ) (3.68)
and particularly in two comparative statics cases, θ̄is increasing in the size
of creditor in the limitting case, and away from the limit it holds that
probability of rollover state of fundamentals







if θ̄ ≥ θ ≥ θ
0 if θ < θ
Where I could not gure out closed form solution, so the possibility that the
size eect of large creditor is not monotonic is not excluded.
Here I present the results from Schuele and Stadler [2005] , where the authors
adopt analogical approach as is in the Corsetti et al. [2004]. I.e. they assume
that small creditors wait for the large one to move rst as this is mutually
benecient, as I have mentioned before.
relatively informed relatively uninformed
investment decision is σ/τ →∞, σ → 0 σ/τ → 0, σ → 0




Observable θ∗ = 0 and θ
∗
= 1 θ∗ = k(1− λ) and θ∗ = k(1− λ) + λ
And the nal result is from the extended sequential moves model , we have
only one switching strategy prole for fundamentals
θ∗ = k − α (3.69)
.
None of the models captures empirically observed detrimental eect of too
big large creditors, that is none of the equations concave in parameter λ,the
size parameter. The only model that allows this interpretation as I was nto
able to dismiss this possibility is the static model, namely when you consider its
comparative statics in the limit. But as this result is mostly obscure, I consider
it highly unlikely.





The problem of coordination is one of the many social phenomena ranging across
social sciences. One of the major examples of early thoughts on coordination
problems can be found in Jean Jacque Rousseau´s Discourse on inequality.
In this manner, men may have insensibly acquired some gross ideas
of mutual undertakings, and of the advantages of fullling them:
that is, just so far as their present and apparent interest was con-
cerned: for they were perfect strangers to foresight, and were so far
from troubling themselves about the distant future, that they hardly
thought of the morrow. If a deer was to be taken, every one saw that,
in order to succeed, he must abide faithfully by his post: but if a
hare happened to come within the reach of any one of them, it is not
to be doubted that he pursued it without scruple, and, having seized
his prey, cared very little, if by so doing he caused his companions
to miss theirs!
This intuitive example is what we nowadays call coordination game  this is ba-
sically what the paper of Carlsson and Van Damme turned into formal model.
What is appealing, albeit not important, about the history of global games is
the fact that one of the most important people in formation of this theory was
Robert K. Merton, a sociologist, who coined the term of self-fullling prophecy
in early 20th century in his paper The Unanticipated Consequences of Purpo-
sive Social Action and even though it is nonessential, the theory he helped to
establish explains the problem of empirical validity of his son´s major paper
and one of the most important papers of nance. For details, see Merton [1936]
.
To stress importance of global games for economic theory as such, I would
like to present a few major answers that I found in currency crises literature, be-
cause the most impressive results were achieved in the eld of currency attacks.
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Currency attack is an attack to currency peg with a view of reaping benets
from doing so. Early models of currency attacks, called First generation models,
based on work by Krugman [1979], completely omit any self-fullling nature of
currency crises. They consider only expectations about government response
to speculative attacks - in other words, they only care about probability that
the government will run out of foreign reserves due to running excessive decit.
This was criticized by Obstfeld [1986], who is founder of so called Second gen-
eration models of currency attacks. His model nally incorporates aspect of
self-fullling nature of currency crises, but in his view investors and government
both observe perfect information, and therefore his model leads to multiple equi-
librium, which somehow decreases impact of his work on economic policy. This
was nally solved by Morris and Shin [1998], who nally create a model with
deserved property of uniqueness of equilibrium where it was possible to track
sources of attack and give sound economic policy advice. This was made pos-
sible by observing that dissemination of public information is a major factor of
currency attack success, because central bank can render attacking speculators




In the beginning I posed a question if the empirical evidence from the German
banks which indicates that with increasing size of the creditors the probability
of foreclosure decreases.
I found that any of these setups I used or referred to cannot explain this
behavior, apart from one that is highly unlikely, but I was not able to dismiss
the possibility of non-monotonic eect of the large creditor. In each of these
models, even in the extended sequential moves model, decreasing foreclosure rate
is present, and especially in the model I built to capture potential misbehavior of
the large creditor the foreclosure level of economic fundamentals is very favorable
for the debtor. But what I consider positive is the fact that the result I obtained
in the extended sequential moves model suggests that under those assumptions
large creditors could be much more helpful regarding foreclosures. That is,
based on their easy access to credit, they could easily nance every project
that is threatened by the fact that creditor coordination problem captures -
it decreases strategic risk as it allows small creditors to behave much more
condently. The fact that empirically observed data are contradictory can be
explained by Hubert and Schaefer [2000], where the authors show that the large
creditors use their power for enforcing of quasi-rents.
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